Encryption News

Open Letter: 107 organizations and cybersecurity experts call on the Belgian Government to halt legislation to undermine end-to-end encryption.

On 29 September, 107 organizations and individual cybersecurity experts, including many members of the Global Encryption Coalition, wrote an open letter to the Belgian Ministers with responsibilities for digital and law enforcement issues.

The Open letter calls on the Belgian government to drop law enforcement access requirements in the Draft law on the collection and storage of identification, traffic and location data in the electronic communications sector and their access by the authorities. These requirements would force operators of end-to-end encrypted systems to undermine encryption to provide access to user communications. There is no way to provide third party access to end-to-end encrypted data without undermining the security and privacy of all users.

Read the open letter below.

29 September 2021

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Administration, Public Enterprises, Telecommunication and the Postal Services Mrs. Petra De Sutter

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and the North Sea Mr. Vincent Van Quickenborne,

Minister of Defense, Mrs. Ludivine Dedonder

Dear Ministers De Sutter, Van Quickenborne, and Dedonder,

End-to-end encryption keeps Belgium safe. 

Encryption protects everyday activities, like handling bank accounts online, securing confidential data like salary slips or tax information, and communicating with your friends and family. End-to-end encryption also protects vulnerable communities and professions where private communications are essential, such as for journalists, lawyers, and medical professionals. 

The Belgian government is considering new legislation, the most dangerous being considered among European Union Member States, that would undermine the security and privacy provided by end-to-end encryption.

The Draft law on the collection and storage of identification, traffic and location data in the electronic communications sector and their access by the authorities,1 or “the Data Retention Legislation,” would require operators of encrypted systems to enable law enforcement to be able to access on request content produced by specific users after a specified date in the future. That is, they would have to be able to “turn off” encryption for specific users. There is no way to simply “turn off” encryption; providers would need to create a new delivery system and send targeted users into that separate delivery system. Not only would this require significant technical changes, but it would thereby break the promises of confidentiality and privacy of end-to-end encrypted communications services.

Far from making Belgians safer, these requirements would undermine the use of end-to-end encryption in Belgium and, as the Belgian Data Protection Authority wrote in its opinion against the Data Retention Legislation, would force companies to create a “de facto backdoor.”2 The consensus among cybersecurity experts is clear: there is no way to provide third party access to end-to-end encrypted communications without also creating encryption backdoors and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by anyone that finds them.3 In other words, there is no way for only law enforcement to have access to backdoors, without risking bad actors from gaining access to the same. Creating encryption backdoors weakens the security of the whole system and puts all its users at risk.4 Undermining encryption by introducing backdoors to encrypted communications would leave Belgium exposed to attacks, including its journalists, doctors, lawyers, public sector employees, and other citizens, as well as businesses and institutions, including governments.

Beyond introducing backdoors into existing end-to-end encrypted systems, the Data Retention Legislation would also discourage companies from offering new end-to-end encrypted products. As seen in other countries that have passed similar legislation,5 the legislation will have a negative impact on trust in Belgian technology companies and damage their ability to compete in the international and European markets. Further, the legislation also threatens to have a wider impact on the European Digital Single Market, as companies in other Member States may be forced to consider these new requirements if they want to offer their products in the Belgian market. 

If the Data Retention Legislation is supposed to make Belgians safer, it cannot do so by undermining the strong protections we all rely on to live our lives; end-to-end encryption should not be threatened or undermined by this legislation.



Access Now

Adriaan Peeters

Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI)

Alexandre Dulaunoy, Security Researcher and Lead of an Incident Response Team,

An Van Wesemael


AP2SI – Associação Portuguesa para a Promoção da Segurança da Informação

Bart Coppens, Professor, Ghent University

Bart Preneel, Prod. dr. ir., University of Leuven

Big Brother Watch

Blacknight Internet Solutions Ltd

Cédric Peeters, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

Centre for Democracy and Technology

Citizen D/Državljan D 

Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA)



Cybersecurity Advisors Network (CyAN)

Domaine Public

Dieter Houthooft, IT Generators BV

Digital Infrastructure Association NL

Dr Dries Van Dyck, CISO, SCK CEN

Digital Infrastructure Association NL

Eddy Willems, G DATA CyberDefense AG

Encryption Europe

European Digital Rights (EDRi)

Filip Lenaerts, CEO, Filip Lenaerts Corporation

Filip Schepers

Frans Gerbosch, Rack 66

Geert Antheunis

Global Partners Digital

Global Voices

Guido De smet

Hannes De Bondt

Homo Digitalis

Immo Deprez

Instituto Beta: Internet & Democracia (Brasil)

Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF)

Internet Society

Internet Society Belgium Chapter

Internet Society Brazil Chapter

Internet Society Catalunya Chapter 

Internet Society Democratic Republic of Congo Chapter

Internet Society Ghana Chapter

​​Internet Society Netherlands Chapter

Internet Society Nigeria Chapter

Internet Society Portugal Chapter

Internet Society India Delhi Chapter

Internet Society India Hyderabad Chapter

IP.rec – Law and Technology Research Institute of Recife

IT-Pol Denmark

Dr. Jan Tobias Muehlberg, KU Leuven, Dept. Computer Science


Jenne Tondeleir

Jens Finkhäuser, Interpeer Project

Jeroen Lambrichts, University of Hasselt

Jochen Timmerman

Joran Leenders

José Legatheaux Martins, Professor, Faculty of Sciences of NOVA University of Lisbon

JUVE Consulting BV

Kijiji Yeetu

Koen Rutten, Managing Partner, Sensin

Koen Van Impe, Comm.V.

Kristof Dujardin

Kristof Provost, FreeBSD


Liga voor Mensenrechten

Ligue des droits humains


Maarten De Bal

Mário Gaspar da Silva, Professor, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

Mathias Bynens

Mega Limited

Merijn De Mil

Milton Mueller, Professor, Internet Governance Project, Georgia Institute of Technology

Netwerk Democratie

Onckelinx & Onckelinx BV

Open Governance Network for Europe


OSCC BV Organization

OSIX s.r.l.

Peter Vandenabeele, All Things Data BV

Peter Van den Broeck, CyberAware Belgium

Peter Vanderborght

Philippe Dreesen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

Privacy & Access Council of Canada


Quantum Leap Development

Rack66 – EUSIP bvba

Raf Jespers, Lawyer, Justis Lawyers Group Antwerp Belgium

Ranking Digital Rights


Riana Pfefferkorn, Research Scholar, Stanford Internet Observatory

Rutger Bevers, CEO,

Sammi Fux


Steven Wittens, Software Engineer, Hacko

Stijn Volckaert, Professor of Computer Science, KU Leuven

Suomen Internet-yhdistys – Internet Society Finland Chapter


Tensr NV

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)



Wim Remes, CEO, Wire Security BV

Youth Forum for Social Justice

*Affiliations listed for identification purposes only